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97 N.C. L. REV. 1828 (2019)

Not Quite ‘A New HOPE’—Privacy Issues Surrounding North
Carolina’s New Opioid Prescription Monitoring Statute*

INTRODUCTION
In the time it takes you to read this article, someone in the United
States will likely fatally overdose on opioids. 1 Drug overdose deaths have
risen dramatically over the last twenty-five years,2 prompting the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services to declare the opioid crisis a
public health emergency. 3 In response, states began creating prescription
drug monitoring programs (“PDMPs”) to reduce overprescribing, both by
helping prescribers make informed decisions and by helping law
enforcement identify deviant prescribers and dispensers. 4 As of 2017, all
fifty states have enacted PDMPs, 5 though the degree to which physicians
are required to use the programs when prescribing opioids varies by state. 6

* © 2019 Darpan N. Patel.
1. See Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec.
19, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/YG9C7Q5D] (stating that more than 130 people die from opioid overdoses every day, or an interpolated
rate of approximately one person every eleven minutes).
2. See Josh Katz, Drug Deaths in America are Rising Faster Than Ever, N.Y. TIMES (June
5,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/05/upshot/opioid-epidemic-drugoverdose-deaths-are-rising-faster-than-ever.html [https://perma.cc/DA6D-B43F (dark archive)]
(showing that drug overdose deaths have been steadily rising since 1990).
3. Julie Hirschfield Davis, Trump Declares Opioid Crisis a ‘Health Emergency’ But
Requests No Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/
10/26/us/politics/trump-opioid-crisis.html
[https://perma.cc/P2M2-F9VR
(dark
archive)]
(“President Trump on Thursday directed the Department of Health and Human Services to
declare the opioid crisis a public health emergency, taking long-anticipated action to address a
rapidly escalating epidemic of drug use.”).
4. See John Matthew Butler, William C. Becker & Keith Humphreys, Big Data and the
Opioid Crisis: Balancing Patient Privacy with Public Health, 46 J.L. MED. & E THICS 440, 440
(2018) (describing the increasing popularity of PDMPs as a tool to aggregate opioid prescription
data: PDMPs enable physicians to better understand patients’ histories with controlled substances
and make informed prescription decisions, and allow law enforcement agencies to identify
prescribers with higher-than-average—potentially malfeasant—opioid prescription rates); see
also, e.g., FLA. S TAT. ANN. § 893.055 (2019) (enumerating Florida’s PDMP); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 218A.202 (Westlaw through Chapter 201 of the 2019 Regular Session) (enumerating
Kentucky’s PDMP); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37f-101, -201 (Westlaw through 2018 Third
Special Session) (enumerating Utah’s PDMP).
5. Austin Huguelet, Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Gets Long-Awaited Approval
in Missouri Senate, ST. LOUIS POST-D ISPATCH (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.stltoday.com/
news/local/govt-and-politics/prescription-drug-monitoring-program-gets-long-awaited-approvalin-missouri/article_5bc2ae1e-294f-5b49-8b52-203e7f0bc098.html [https://perma.cc/9RH3-F9LV]
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In North Carolina, the rate of overdose deaths nearly doubled between
2010 and 2018,7 with several counties reporting overdose death rates ten to
nearly twenty times the national average. 8 Responding to these types of
trends in previous years, North Carolina established its own PDMP in
2005, called the Controlled Substances Reporting System (“CSRS”), under
the CSRS Act.9 As enacted, the purpose of the CSRS is to identify patients
who are abusing opioids, reduce overall mortality rates from opioid misuse,
and facilitate law enforcement investigation of illicit diversion of opioids. 10
Diversion here refers to illicit or medically unnecessary supply or use of
controlled substances that are otherwise legal and medically necessary. 11
The CSRS is housed in the North Carolina Department of Health and
Human Services and serves as a repository for prescriptions of controlled
substances given to “ultimate users” by “dispensers.”12 An “ultimate user”
is any person who lawfully obtains a controlled substance from a dispenser
for use in his or her household.13 “Dispensers” provide controlled
substances to “ultimate users” and are most typically pharmacists.14 The
CSRS Act requires prescribers, typically physicians, to use the CSRS to
look at a patient’s prescription history when deciding whether to prescribe

(announcing the Missouri Senate’s passage of its own PDMP and indicating that it is the last state
to do so).
6. PDMP Mandatory Query by Prescribers and Dispensers, PDMPASSIST.ORG (Jan. 2,
2018), http://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/Mandatory_Query_20180102.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A9LPZ4Z] (stating that forty states mandate PDMP use to some degree, and fourteen require both
prescribers and dispensers to use PDMPs).
7. North Carolina Opioid Summary: Opioid-Related Overdose Deaths, NAT’L INST. ON
DRUG ABUSE (Feb. 2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/opioid-summaries-by-state/north-carolinaopioid-summary [https://perma.cc/2544-C96J] (“Since 2010, when the rate was 8.1 deaths per
100,000 persons, the rate has almost doubled.”).
8. Forsyth, Guilford, Mecklenburg, and Wake counties report overdose death rates that are
in gross excess of the national average of almost twenty-two deaths per 100,000 people. See
North Carolina Drug Overdose Deaths, COUNTY HEALTH R ANKINGS & ROADMAPS (2018),
https://www.countyhealthrankings.org/app/north-carolina/2018/measure/factors/138/data
[https://perma.cc/GUL8-KMMN]; Opioid Overdose Death Rates and All Drug Overdose Death
Rates per 100,000 Population (Age Adjusted), HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2017),
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/opioid-overdose-death-rates/?currentTimeframe=0&
sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
[https://perma.cc/42EU-ZAF2].
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.70 to -113.71 (2017).
10. See id. § 90-113.71(b) (describing legislative purposes of the CSRS Act).
11. PROGRAM EVALUATION D IV., N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, NORTH C AROLINA NEEDS TO
STRENGTHEN ITS SYSTEM FOR MONITORING AND PREVENTING THE ABUSE OF PRESCRIBED
CONTROLLED S UBSTANCES 8 (2014), https://www.ncleg.net/PED/Reports/documents/
Rx/Rx_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8JH-2SPY].
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.73 (describing the establishment and maintenance of the
controlled substances reporting system).
13. Id. § 90-113.72(5).
14. Id. § 90-113.72(4).
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a controlled substance to the patient. 15 As of 2017, with the enactment of
the Strengthen Opioid Misuse Prevention (STOP) Act, dispensers are now
also subject to civil penalties if they fail to report prescription data to the
CSRS.16
One important aspect of the CSRS Act was the degree to which it
limited law enforcement access to patient data in the CSRS. The statute
declared that law enforcement could request data from the CSRS only for a
“bona fide specific investigation” that is “related to the enforcement of
laws governing licit drugs pursuant to a lawful court order specifically
issued for that purpose.”17 Providing judicial oversight of law enforcement
access to CSRS data is particularly important because the CSRS houses
private medical information.
More recently, in June 2018, North Carolina enacted the Heroin and
Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act, which removed the
requirement for a “lawful court order” to release patient prescription data to
local law enforcement. 18 While the HOPE Act does require that law
enforcement officers only access information pursuant to investigations
where there is a “reasonable, good-faith belief based on specific facts and
circumstances,” 19 individual officers can construe these standards
differently and may be less likely to be as impartial as a judge when
deciding whether there is legitimate basis for an investigation.
The HOPE Act also attempted to balance concerns about patient
health data privacy in several ways. First, it imposed specific penalties,
including civil fines and a private right of action, on law enforcement
officers who inappropriately disseminate patient prescription data accessed
through the CSRS. 20 Second, the HOPE Act required that law enforcement
officers become “certified diversion investigators” before they can request
15. Id. § 90-113.74C(a) (“Prior to initially prescribing a targeted controlled substance to a
patient, a practitioner shall review the information in the controlled substances reporting system
. . . .”).
16. Strengthen Opioid Misuse Prevention Act of 2017, ch. 74, sec. 10, § 90-113.73, 2017
N.C. Sess. Laws 684, 685, 690–91 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.73 (2017))
(establishing “civil penalties for pharmacies that employ dispensers who improperly report
information to the controlled substances reporting system (CSRS)”).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(c)(5) (2017) (emphasis added).
18. Compare Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act of 2018, ch. 44,
§ 11.(b), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21, 28–30 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90113.74(c)(5a), (i)) (indicating that CSRS data can also be released to local law enforcement who
are designated certified diversion investigators and meet other stated requirements but not
requiring a court order), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(c)(5) (requiring a court order pursuant
to the active investigation in order to release CSRS data).
19. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act § 11.(b), 2018-3 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. at 29 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(i)(7(a)).
20. See id. §§ 11.(a), 12, 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 27, 30 (LexisNexis) (to be
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-113.74(k), -113.75(a), (b)).

97 N.C. L. REV. 1828 (2019)

2019]

PRIVACY & OPIOID MONITORING

1831

prescription data.21 Certified diversion investigators are defined as
“officer[s] affiliated with a qualified law enforcement agency” 22 who pass
the required “minimum standards” for “certification” under the statute. 23
Notwithstanding incorporation of these balancing measures, removing
direct judicial oversight for police access to prescription data has led to an
outcry from North Carolina lawmakers, constituents, health organizations,
and civil liberties groups. 24 Given the contentious nature of using patient
prescription data for law enforcement purposes, it will be difficult to
resolve this issue in such a way that all concerned parties are satisfied with
the solution.
In its current form, the HOPE Act permits law enforcement to access
prescription data with little restraint. Given the significance of the privacy
interests at stake, and the relative lack of evidence that PDMPs reduce
opioid abuse, the North Carolina General Assembly should err on the side
of protecting prescription data privacy and amend the HOPE Act
accordingly. This analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I sets forth a
framework to weigh tradeoffs between privacy imperatives in protecting
autonomy and prosecutorial utility of PDMP prescription data. Part II
explores privacy issues arising from elements of the HOPE Act’s statutory
scheme. Part III aims to mitigate prescription data privacy concerns by
proposing amendments that can be implemented even without reinstating
the previous court order requirement. Finally, the Conclusion briefly

21. Id. § 11.(b), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 28 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(i)(1)).
22. Id. § 11.(b), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 29 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. 90-113.74(i)(7)(a1)).
23. Id. §§ 11.(b), 13, 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 28–29, 31 (LexisNexis) (to be
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-113.74(i)(1)(a), -113.74(7)(a1), -113.74E) (allowing release of
CSRS data only to law enforcement who have passed the “minimum standards” necessary to
become certified diversion investigators, which include training on opioid diversion methods,
appropriate CSRS use to identify potential diversion, and basic data privacy).
24. Rashaan Ayesh, Police Access to Prescription Database Approved in the NC
Legislature, NEWS & OBSERVER (June 15, 2018), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politicsgovernment/article213193544.html [https://perma.cc/6ZK9-296L (dark archive)] (“Many House
members were supportive of the bill as a whole but criticized the component regarding law
enforcement access to the Controlled Substance Reporting System.”); Julie Havlak, HOPE Act
Heads to Governor But Civil Liberties Concerns Remain, CAROLINA J. (June 15, 2018),
https://www.carolinajournal.com/news-article/hope-act-heads-to-governor-but-civil-libertarianconcerns-remain/ [https://perma.cc/2K9T-Y3XL] (indicating Fourth Amendment-based concerns
from civil liberties groups and legislative officials due to lack of judicial oversight of the release
of CSRS data); Taylor Knopf, New Opioid Bill Gets Support from Law Enforcement, Concern
from
Recovery
Advocates,
N.C.
HEALTH
NEWS
(June
7,
2018),
https://www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2018/06/07/new-opioid-bill-gets-support-from-lawenforcement-concern-from-recovery-advocates/ [https://perma.cc/8DQM-QGXP] (commenting
on objections to the HOPE Act by advocacy groups such as the Addiction Professionals of NC,
the NC SUD Federation, and the N.C. Harm Reduction Coalition).
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recapitulates the main points from Parts II and III into a coherent map of
proposed revisions to the HOPE Act.
I. WEIGHING D ATA PRIVACY INTERESTS
Individuals have a strong privacy interest in their own medical
information. Patients have no control over the production or documentation
of their medical history25 but must necessarily relinquish their personal
health information in order to receive quality care.26 Additionally, patients
do not control who collects or manages their data—these processes are
legally enshrined. 27 Given patients’ unique lack of control over their own
medical data and the sensitive nature of that data, the law recognizes
patients’ right to privacy over their medical data, 28 to varying degrees, in
nearly all countries.29
Personal medical data is a metric approximation of our visceral selves
and is accordingly among the most intimate of private information.
Maintaining privacy over medical data is paramount because control over
access to personal medical data prevents undue influence by employers,
insurers, and other actors seeking to leverage medical data into
discriminatory decisionmaking. 30 Regulating access to personal medical
information, therefore, promotes individual autonomy. 31 While this interest
in autonomy is not an overriding absolute, in cases where the public benefit
of granting third-party access is not ascertainable, protecting autonomy
should be afforded greater weight because the individual harms resulting
from disclosure of personal data are substantial.32 Unauthorized disclosure

25. See Bonnie Kaplan, Patient Health Data Privacy 3 (Yale Inst. for Soc’y & Policy
Studies, Working Paper No. 14-028, 2014) (stating that medical information is both generated
and housed by institutions without the consent of individual patients).
26. Id. at 3 (indicating that if an individual seeks quality health care, they must share
personal health information).
27. Id. (characterizing medical data as distinct from other data because its collection and
storage is “legally mandated,” as opposed to simply incentivized privately for the provision of
quality care).
28. Id. at 5 (“Because of its sensitive nature, separate laws and regulations govern privacy
risks of medical records.”).
29. Id. at 10.
30. Joy L. Pritts, The Importance and Value of Protecting the Privacy of Health Information
4
(2008)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/
media/Files/Activity%20Files/Research/HIPAAandResearch/PrittsPrivacyFinalDraftweb.ashx
[https://perma.cc/4CE6-KEUJ].
31. See id. at 6.
32. Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Personal Privacy and Common Goods: A
Framework for Balancing Under the National Health Information Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 1439, 1441–42 (2002) (“If the data, however, are disclosed in ways that are unlikely to
achieve a strong public benefit, and the personal risks are high, individual interests in autonomy
should prevail.”).

97 N.C. L. REV. 1828 (2019)

2019]

PRIVACY & OPIOID MONITORING

1833

of medical data can result in personal consequences ranging from social
ostracism to reducing an individual’s liklihood of pursuing medical
treatment due to loss of trust in health care providers. 33 Therefore, any
potential public benefit must be weighed against the risk of unauthorized
disclosure and intrusion on autonomy. Applying this framework, experts
contend the law should prioritize patient autonomy if it is unclear whether
the use of PDMPs yield a clear public benefit. 34
Importantly, an expansive review of numerous recent studies
concludes it is unclear whether PDMPs are effective as a whole. 35 While
PDMPs have proven effective in certain situations, research suggests these
successes are typically confined to a particular constellation of variables: a
specific state or geographical area, a specific drug, or a specific PDMP
operational structure. 36 Variable-specific efficacy of PDMP use may make
it difficult to determine the scope of utility even in those states where these
programs have been situationally effective because it is potentially difficult
to parse the effects of intersecting variables on opioid misuse. More
generally, while PDMPs are sometimes effective at slowing increases in
opioid misuse, they are not typically effective at decreasing the overall
incidence of misuse. 37 Additionally, in studies done before all states
adopted PDMPs, opioid overdose mortality was not consistently lower in
states that had instituted PDMPs. 38 Since aggregate data suggests it is at
best unclear whether PDMPs are effective, ambiguities should also be
construed against PDMP utility. There is no presumptive public benefit of
PDMP use—the benefit only exists if it can be unequivocally shown.

33. Id. at 1448 (“[Medical confidentiality] allows patients to feel comfortable divulging
personal information that is often needed for accurate diagnoses and treatment. As explained
above, unauthorized uses or disclosures may subject individuals to embarrassment, social stigma,
and discrimination.”).
34. See id. at 1442.
35. Christopher A. Griggs, Scott G. Weiner & James A. Feldman, Prescription Drug
Monitoring Programs: Examining Limitations and Future Approaches, XVI WESTERN J.
EMERGENCY MED. 67, 67 (2015) (finding that it is hard to determine whether opioid overdoserelated death reduction is due to PDMPs, “laws limiting dispensing of medications,” or “overall
prescriber awareness of the risks of opioids,” and further indicating that PDMPs have had mixed
effects on opioid prescribing); Erin P. Finley et al., Evaluating the Impact of Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program Implementation: A Scoping Review, 17 BMC HEALTH SERVS. RES., 2017, at
4 (“[T]he extant literature reveals mixed findings about the impact of PDMPs as a tool for
reducing misuse and diversion of controlled substances.”).
36. Finley et al., supra note 35, at 6 (noting that because the statutory characteristics and
implementation of PDMPs vary considerably from state to state, pinpointing which specific
features of any given PDMP are responsible for efficacy or the lack thereof is difficult).
37. Liza M. Reifler et al., Do Prescription Monitoring Programs Impact State Trends in
Opioid Abuse/Misuse?, 13 PAIN MED. 434, 434–42 (2012).
38. Finley et al., supra note 35, at 4 (reviewing studies on opioid use-related mortality and
finding that there is “no clear pattern of reduced overdose mortality in PDMP states”).
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In North Carolina, a recent study found the CSRS is heavily
underutilized, with prescribers and dispensers only using the system six
percent of the time a prescription is written or filled. 39 Another study found
that inability to account for key factors bearing on presence or absence of
opioid misuse, such as idiosyncratic variations in prescribing practices,
makes it difficult to determine efficacy, further confounding analysis of
CSRS utility. 40 Going forward, it may be easier to analyze CSRS utility
since the STOP Act enacted a punitive statutory scheme enforcing
dispenser reporting. 41 As of yet, however, there is no evidence suggesting
that mandating dispenser reporting is sufficient to make the CSRS effective.
In summary, applying the PDMP public benefit framework to the
expansion of law enforcement CSRS access, the law should prioritize
prescription data privacy for two reasons. First, aggregate data suggests
CSRS use does not significantly affect rates of opioid diversion. Second,
ambiguities due to irregular prescriber reporting make it even more
difficult to conclusively show CSRS efficacy. Taken together, it is unclear
whether there is a cognizable public benefit from CSRS use by law
enforcement that outweighs the harm to individuals resulting from
disclosure of a patient’s medical information without the patient’s consent.
II. PRIVACY ISSUES IN THE STATUTORY SCHEME
Several features of the HOPE Act raise privacy concerns, in part due
to the substance of the provisions and in part due to the interplay between
different statutory sections. Part A examines two effects of the new
statutory penalties under the HOPE Act. First, differences in applying these
penalties create perverse incentives for law enforcement officers to solicit
data directly from pharmacies as opposed to the CSRS. Second, even if this
were not the case, the penalty system incentivizes counterproductive use of
prescription data. Part B exposes gaps in coverage by the statutory
penalties and analyzes unnecessarily restrictive language that could impede
prosecution of future violators of the HOPE Act.

39. PROGRAM EVALUATION D IV., N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, supra note 11, at 20.
40. See Christopher Ringwalt et al., The Use of a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program to
Develop Algorithms to Identify Providers with Unusual Prescribing Practices for Controlled
Substances, 36 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION 287, 296 (2015) (finding that false positives and
negatives are likely to occur because of differences in provider practices and incomplete data).
41. Strengthen Opioid Misuse Prevention Act of 2017, ch. 74, sec. 10, § 90-113.73, 2017
N.C. Sess. Laws 690, 690–91 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.73 (2017)).
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Privacy Issues Related to Direct Access to Pharmacy Records

The HOPE Act allows certified diversion investigators (“CDIs”)42 to
solicit prescription data directly from pharmacies.43 Allowing direct
acquisition of pharmacy-derived individual prescription data rather than
mandating access exclusively through the CSRS presents potentially
perverse incentives for law enforcement to bypass the already limited
privacy protections presented in the statutory scheme. This is particularly
true given that the statute does not prescribe clear oversight mechanisms
for prescription data solicited directly from pharmacies.
Admittedly, it is not unusual for states to statutorily prescribe a right
of inspection for administrative agencies to oversee pharmacy
recordkeeping.44 Most states also allow enforcement officials to inspect
pharmacy records for controlled substance regulation purposes. 45 On the
other hand, a 2014 survey found that fewer states allow local law
enforcement officers to solicit prescription data directly from pharmacies
without a court order.46 Nevertheless, acknowledging that a number of
states do allow local law enforcement to access pharmacy prescription data
without a court order,47 the HOPE Act’s similar grant of access does not, at
first glance, seem indefensible.
The vast majority of states, including North Carolina, also
differentiate privacy of prescription data housed in PDMPs from pharmacy
records48—there are less stringent guidelines for directly accessing
prescription data from pharmacies than for prescription data in the CSRS. 49
42. See supra text accompanying notes 21–23.
43. See Heroin and Opioid Enforcement and Prevention (HOPE) Act of 2018, ch. 44, § 8,
2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21, 23 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90107.1).
44. Prescription Monitoring Programs, Pharmacy Records and the Right to Privacy, NAT’L
ALL.
FOR
MODEL
DRUG
L AWS
21
(Mar.
2014),
https://namsdl.org/wpcontent/uploads/Prescription-Monitoring-Programs-Pharmacy-Records-and-the-Right-toPrivacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/K82F-YWWF] (finding that state PDMPs typically allow access but
impose more stringent restrictions on law enforcement access to prescription records without a
court order than do the respective state pharmacy statutes).
45. Id. (“Every state across the country requires that prescription records be kept by
pharmacists, and most allow access to those records to certain officials without a warrant.”).
46. Id. at app. B (stating only twenty states allow law enforcement officers access to
prescription records housed in pharmacies without a court order authorizing access: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Vermont,
and Washington).
47. Id.
48. Id. (showing side-by-side comparisons of distinct privacy requirements for pharmacyderived and PDMP-derived prescription data for all fifty states).
49. Compare Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act of 2018, ch. 44,
§ 11.(b), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21, 28 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-113.74(i)(1(d)) (requiring the State Bureau of Investigation to review and approve law
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Presumably, this is because prescription data taken directly from
pharmacies must be collected incrementally by going from pharmacy to
pharmacy.50 That process makes it more difficult for unauthorized or
malicious users to quickly gain access to multiple patients’ records,
especially when compared to PDMP use.
The statutory scheme in the HOPE Act, however, potentially creates
perverse incentives for CDIs to preferentially solicit prescription data
directly from pharmacies rather than from the CSRS because of differences
in statutorily and administratively defined punitive measures. The HOPE
Act created new statutory penalties for unauthorized access to or disclosure
of prescription data; 51 however, the penalties only apply to prescription data
in the CSRS. 52 While the HOPE Act does enact a new section, section 90107.1, that prohibits CDIs from disclosing pharmacy-derived prescription
data through channels not “allowed by law,” 53 the Act does not
affirmatively address unauthorized access.54 Moreover, while the HOPE
Act clearly prohibits CDIs from improperly disclosing pharmacy-derived
prescription data, the Act does not enumerate a statutory penalty for CDIs
who do so.55
Similarly, the extant statute allowing law enforcement to access
pharmacy-derived prescription data prohibits improper disclosure of that
data but does not set forth a statutory penalty. 56 State regulatory agencies
also have not promulgated administrative codes defining penalties for
improper disclosure. 57 Failure to expressly define statutory or
administrative penalties for improper CDI disclosure of pharmacy-derived
prescription data could perversely incentivize the use of section 90-107.1 as

enforcement requests for access to prescription data in the CRS), with id. § 8, 2018-3 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. at 23–24 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-107.1) (omitting any
requirement that law enforcement seek review or approval by the State Bureau of Investigation
before accessing pharmacy-derived prescription data).
50. See, e.g., Prescription Monitoring Programs, Pharmacy Records and the Right to
Privacy, supra note 44, at 21–22 (“Florida allows law enforcement to go from pharmacy to
pharmacy and request and receive copies of patient prescriptions without a warrant, but does not
allow law enforcement to have direct access to the prescription monitoring database or to receive
information from the database without approval of the program manager . . . .”).
51. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act § 11.(a), 2018-3 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. at 27 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(k)).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 8, 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 24 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-107.1(d)).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-107 (2017).
57. See generally 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 26F (Supp. 2019) (outlining regulations for
controlled substances without dedicating any provisions to punitive measures for law enforcement
officers that improperly disclose prescription data).
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a less scrupulously regulated alternative to the CSRS. Data that would be
otherwise inaccessible through the CSRS, due to improper purpose or lack
of substantiation of need, could potentially be accessed by going directly to
the pharmacies housing the data.
Statutory oversight of pharmacy-derived prescription data is
comparatively more limited than that over CSRS data, compounding the
problem. While the HOPE Act prohibits CDIs from accessing CSRS data
without a formal request to and approval by the State Bureau of
Investigation, 58 the Act institutes unfettered access to prescription data
when requested directly from pharmacies. 59 The State Bureau of
Investigation does not prospectively review CDI access of pharmacyderived prescription data under section 90-107.1;60 rather, it only reviews
reports of such data retrospectively through random audits. 61 Because there
is no prospective or request-based oversight, section 90-107.1 provides law
enforcement officials a “backdoor” means to indiscriminately solicit
prescription data from pharmacies in a geographic area for a named opioiddiversion suspect even when a similar request to the CSRS might have
been denied.
Certainly, soliciting prescription data broadly from pharmacies in an
area is somewhat difficult since specific individuals must be named in
order to pursue a valid search. 62 However, because there is no language
limiting the scope of inquiry and no requirement of “probable cause” or a
similarly stringent evidentiary threshold requisite for investigation, CDIs
could feasibly search for a number of individuals in a broad geographical
area. Conducting such ostensibly broad searches would still carry a risk to
the law enforcement official given the random audits of prescription data
accessed directly from pharmacies. Nevertheless, it creates a vehicle for
law enforcement to engage in a cost-benefit analysis between overbroad
solicitation of prescription data and punishment for potentially
inappropriate searching—a decision calculus that forecasts potential abuses
of police powers.

58. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act of 2018, ch. 44, § 11.(b),
2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21, 28 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90113.74(i)(1)(d)) (mandating that “[t]he request has been reviewed and approved by the State
Bureau of Investigation”).
59. See id. § 8, 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 23 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-107.1(c)).
60. See id. § 8, 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 23 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-107.1(b)).
61. Id. § 8, 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 23 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90.107(a)(5)).
62. Id. (requiring that the investigating CDI provide the “first name, last name, and date of
birth” for individuals whose prescription data is sought).
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Even taken in the light most favorable to the statute, wherein CDIs
only request data from pharmacies for named opioid-diversion suspects in a
particular geographic area, acquiring prescription data under section 90107.1 is at best inefficient because it requires CDIs to iteratively and
indiscriminately inspect all the pharmacies in a given area. Other states
have solved this problem. For example, Kentucky’s PDMP (called
“KASPER”)63 is one of the most effective in the country.64 Over the last
two decades, KASPER implementation has moved Kentucky from secondhighest to thirty-first in rate of nonmedical use of prescription painkillers.65
Kentucky law enforcement officials have been able to use de-identified
data from PDMPs to pinpoint hotspots and communities most at risk. 66 This
approach requires data directly from the PDMP and arguably relies on law
enforcement officials not soliciting prescription data from individual
pharmacies to avoid generating piecemeal and potentially misrepresentative
data sets. By contrast, in addition to creating a backdoor channel for
improper solicitation of prescription data, such access to North Carolina
prescription data under section 90-107.1 also disincentivizes uses of the
CSRS that might stand a greater chance of benefiting the mission of law
enforcement officials.
Although disavowal of the court order requirement for local law
enforcement CSRS access does not disrupt the traditional dynamic of lesser
protections afforded to pharmacy-derived prescription data, the HOPE
Act’s dissimilar statutory penalty schemes for these two vehicles of access
facilitate abuses of police powers. Explicit statutory penalties (or regulatory
penalties promulgated by the State Bureau of Investigation) for CDIs who
improperly disclose pharmacy-derived prescription data would help address
this issue.

63. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.202 (Westlaw through Chapter 201 of the 2019
Regular Session) (laying out Kentucky’s “[e]lectronic system for monitoring controlled
substances”).
64. See Pennsylvania Looks to Upgrade Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, INST. FOR
RES.,
EDUC.
&
TRAINING
IN
ADDICTIONS
(June
21,
2013),
https://ireta.org/resources/pennsylvania-looks-to-upgrade-prescription-drug-monitoring-program/
[https://perma.cc/VQP8-WNS4] (indicating that Kentucky’s PMDP is considered a “gold
standard”).
65. Id. (“Kentucky has seen its ranking among states with the highest nonmedical use of
prescription painkillers drop from second to thirty-first place, reflecting a drop that officials
attribute largely to its monitoring program.”).
66. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: A Guide For Healthcare Providers,
SUBSTANCE
ABUSE
& MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
ADMIN.
1,
6
(2017),
https://store.samhsa.gov/system/files/sma16-4997.pdf [https://perma.cc/D63B-X2EU] (indicating
that state departmental health officials can use de-identified aggregate PDMP data to determine
which communities present the greatest need for, and the opportunity for greatest benefit from,
opioid treatment and prevention programs).
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Ineffective Language Hamstrings CSRS-Related Penalties

The HOPE Act establishes a penalty for indirectly accessing CSRS
data that is inadequate to protect against potential abuse of police powers.
A recent case from the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Brumley v. City of
Cleveland (“Brumley II”),67 illustrates the gap in the law. In Brumley II,
two members of a regional drug task force approached the plaintiff, Police
Officer Brumley, with suspicions that the task force director “might be
abusing prescription medications.”68 In an unrelated judicial proceeding,
the presiding judge informed Officer Brumley that the task force director
“appeared to be under the influence” while in chambers. 69 Officer Brumley
subsequently asked his neighbor, a pharmacist, to look up the task force
director’s prescription drug history in the state PDMP. 70 Officer Brumley
found no evidence of prescription abuse. 71 More importantly, he was
subsequently terminated, in part because he violated state law and
departmental policy by soliciting PDMP data prior to opening an active
investigation pursuant to the matter. 72 However, after affirming the trial
court’s ruling of summary judgment against Officer Brumley, 73 the
Tennessee Court of Appeals, in Brumley III, ultimately reversed the grant
of summary judgment against Officer Brumley on grounds that there was a
genuine question of fact as to whether the city legally terminated him. 74 As
part of its analysis, the court considered testimony of other officers in the
department (previously rejected as inadmissible in lower court
proceedings) about how case facts are often examined preliminarily before
opening an active investigation. 75

67. No. E2012-00002-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 1737860 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2013)
[hereinafter Brumley II].
68. Id. at *1.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at *2.
73. Id. at *2, *7.
74. No. E2014-02213-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 6000551, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15,
2015) [hereinafter Brumley III] (“Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
as we are constrained to do, we conclude that there was material evidence from which the trier of
fact could conclude that Plaintiff’s employment was terminated solely for his refusal to remain
silent about Chief Snyder’s alleged illegal actions. Accordingly, we further conclude that the trial
court erred in dismissing the complaint at this point in the proceedings because material questions
of fact remained.”).
75. Id. at *2 (referring to testimony of another officer in the department who stated “that it
was not common practice for officers to open a case file and inform their superior officers of
criminal investigations that are in the early preliminary stage”).
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This is disconcerting—Tennessee’s confidentiality provisions at the
time of Brumley required a case number for PDMP use,76 as is currently
true in North Carolina.77 Despite soliciting a pharmacist in order to
circuitously access PDMP data without a case number, Officer Brumley’s
actions, hypothetically, might have been permissible had there been a
strong enough case that he was acting in accordance with local law
enforcement regulations. This case raises two further concerns. First,
administrative codes or departmental policies should be promulgated by
local law enforcement departments to ensure safeguards under the HOPE
Act are effective. Second, statutory felonies for CDIs who access or
disclose prescription data “from the system for a purpose not authorized” 78
may be insufficient in scope to adequately protect patient privacy.
Departmental codes would help curb the risk of CDIs improperly
accessing or disclosing prescription data. Although the court in Brumley III
did not find dispositive the expert testimony regarding divergent
procedures for initiating investigations, at minimum the court indicated
such evidence should be considered. 79 If police officers are allowed to raise
such de facto defenses to statutorily or departmentally prescribed processes
designed to protect citizens’ privacy interests, the department protocols
should be explicitly written to avoid usurping legislative intent.
This is no mere question of administration, thus little deference need
be given to the departments. Whether officers adhere to the requirement for
an active case investigation before using the CSRS, or solicit pharmacists
to access CSRS data and circumvent statutory privacy protections, is a
question that lies at the heart of the statute. Additionally, since
departmental officials are best poised to directly oversee the actions of
CDIs, it is prudent to empower departmental policies to facilitate oversight.
Therefore, local law enforcement should take extraordinary care to ensure
that their departmental protocols are clearly defined and reflect the
processes and privacy safeguards reflected in the statute.
Expanding the scope of statutory protections against improper access
or disclosure of prescription information is equally important. Statutory
76. TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-10-306(b) (Westlaw through the 2019 First Reg. Sess.) (“When
requesting information from the database, law enforcement personnel shall provide a case number
as part of the process for requesting information from the database. The case number entered shall
correspond with an official investigation involving controlled substances and information
requested should directly relate to the investigation.”).
77. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act of 2018, ch. 44, § 11.(b),
2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21, 30 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90113.74(j)(2)(a)).
78. Id. § 11.(a), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 27 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. 90-113.74(k)(2)).
79. See Brumley III, 2015 WL 6000551, at *2.
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penalties created under section 90-113.74(k) of the HOPE Act apply
primarily to accessing data “from the [CSRS]” for a “purpose not
authorized by [section 90-113.74].”80 Under section 90-113.74, the relevant
permissible statutory purpose is “for investigative or evidentiary purposes
related to violations of State or federal law.” 81 This specified purpose may
be overbroad—CDIs can investigate any case rationally related to a
concern about controlled substance issues without violating the statute.
Although there are some protections for confidentiality of prescription data
built into extant legislation, 82 there is little recourse for unsavory methods
used to acquire information.
Furthermore, the only portion of section 90-113.74 criminalizing
indirect access to prescription information in the CSRS requires that the
individual have “willfully and maliciously obtain[ed], disclose[d], or
disseminate[d] prescription information . . . and with the intent to use such
information for commercial advantage or personal gain, or to maliciously
harm any person.” 83 Because of the conjunctive “and” in the statute, willful
and malicious actions can only be prosecuted under the statute if they also
involve use of prescription information for “commercial advantage,”
“personal gain,” or to “maliciously harm.” 84 However, delimiting potential
“willfully and maliciously” taken actions to these three categories shackles
the statute’s ability to safeguard against impropriety outside of this
narrowly defined scope. In fact, other North Carolina statutes felonizing
willful or malicious actions typically do not exhibit such extensive
conditioning of the mental state, 85 possibly to provide prosecutorial
flexibility in bringing a case forward. All penalties under section 90-113.74
are already detrimentally limited to “purpose[s] not authorized” 86 by the
statute. Further restricting the scope of punishable actions taken “willfully
80. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act § 11.(a), 2018-3 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. at 27 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(k)).
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(a) (2017) (“[E]xcept as otherwise provided below [CSRS
data] may only be used (i) for investigative or evidentiary purposes related to violations of State
or federal law . . . .”).
82. See id. (stating that “prescription information shall not be disclosed or disseminated to
any person or entity by any person or entity authorized to review prescription information,” but
failing to describe any statutory penalty if this provision is violated).
83. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act § 11.(a), 2018-3 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. at 27 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(k)(3)) (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-49 (2017) (declaring that “[a]ny person who willfully
and maliciously injures another by the use of any explosive or incendiary device or material is
guilty of a Class D felony” but not including language further delimiting the mental state); id.
§ 14-163 (“If any person shall willfully and unlawfully poison any horse, mule, hog, sheep or
other livestock, the property of another, such person shall be punished as a Class I felon.”).
86. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act § 11.(a), 2018-3 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. at 27 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(k)).
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and maliciously” unduly weakens statutory safeguards against improper
CDI use of CSRS prescription data.
III. AMENDING THE HOPE ACT TO SAFEGUARD PRIVACY
Amending the HOPE Act can facilitate safeguarding of prescription
data privacy, even without reimplementing the previous court order
requirement. In this section, I propose two amendments to accomplish this
goal. First, the North Carolina General Assembly should import existing
language from the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (“HIPAA”) to restrict the scope of CSRS information given to law
enforcement officials to the scope canonically applied to the same context
under HIPAA. Second, it should enumerate a statutory right to patient
revision of prescription drug records in the CSRS.
A.

Limiting the Scope of Accessed Information

While the HOPE Act does require the State Bureau of Investigation to
approve CDI requests to access CSRS data, 87 the Act would benefit from
language limiting the scope and nature of the requested information. In
particular, the Act lacks language restricting access to unrelated patient
information or limiting the scope of prescription data to immediate needs of
an “active investigation.” 88 Instead, the HOPE Act relies on a punitive
statutory scheme to deter inappropriately expansive sweeps of patient
prescription and personal data.89 As indicated in Part II, there are numerous
issues surrounding the scope of implementation of these provisions and
their ability to safeguard privacy interests. 90 Therefore, restricting
information access at the outset is more likely to be effective than relying
on punitive measures to deter indiscriminate access to medication data.
Nearly half of the North Carolina House of Representatives similarly
wanted to restrict initial data access; their opinion was made apparent
during final debate on the HOPE Act. 91 Representative Robert Reives (DSanford) proposed an amendment that would require local law enforcement
87. Id. § 11.(b), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 28 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(i)(1)(d)).
88. The requirement that the request be “reasonably related to a bona fide active
investigation” only relates to the relevance of the requested information, not the type of personal
data or the scope of prescription data to be granted. See id. § 11.(b), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis.
Serv. at 28 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(i)(1)(c)).
89. See id. § 11.(a), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 27 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(k)).
90. See supra Section II.A.
91. See S.B. 616, amend. A5, Gen. Assemb., 2017–2018 Sess. (N.C. 2018) (amending § 90113.74(i) to include a “court order” requirement for CDI access to the CSRS, but failing to pass
the North Carolina Senate on a 48-55 vote).
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to obtain a court order before accessing prescription data, as had been the
case under the STOP Act, but the amendment narrowly failed to pass with
a vote of forty-eight in favor and fifty-five against.92 Support for the
amendment largely fell along party lines but did include several Republican
members like Representative Michael Speciale (R-New Bern), who pointed
out that “[t]he issue is not whether this bill is needed . . . but [that] it
oversteps itself when it allows the government to look at private records
without a warrant.”93 Similarly, Representative David Rogers (RRutherfordton) pointed out that removal of the requirement for a warrant or
court order is problematic because the “reasonable, good faith” standard is
ambiguous, and “what to one officer may be reasonable, to a judge is
completely unreasonable.”94 Pushback against the amendment focused
primarily on the need for a prompt response to law enforcement requests
for data access, with Representative Gregory Murphy (R-Greenville) and
others emphasizing the need to act quickly, contending that under current
law “it takes five to seven days to get a judge to sign off on something.” 95
As it stands, the HOPE Act prioritizes the perceived need for a prompt
response over ensuring law enforcement officials do not access more
prescription data than is reasonably needed for an active investigation. This
is particularly problematic given the lack of compelling evidence showing
that PDMPs are effective at reducing opioid diversion rates, as discussed in
Part I. Under the framework established in Part I, requiring a court order
for access to prescription data, as was the standard under the CSRS and
STOP acts,96 would be the ideal safeguard to protect data privacy, and
therefore patient autonomy. The General Assembly could look to other
states, most recently Utah, that have reverted from a warrantless standard to
a “court order” standard without issue. 97
If reverting to a “court order” standard remains politically intractable,
however, consensus might more easily be leveraged to incorporate
unambiguous language limiting dissemination of medication data to what is
reasonably necessary for pursuing the active investigation. This is not

92. Id.
93. Taylor Knopf, Debate Over New Opioid Bill Dragged on Through the Night, N.C.
HEALTH NEWS (June 14, 2018), https://www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2018/06/14/debateover-hope-act-dragged-on-through-the-night/ [https://perma.cc/693M-Y2R5].
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(c)(5) (2017); see Strengthen Opioid Misuse Prevention
Act of 2017, ch. 74, sec. 11, § 90-113.74, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 684, 691–92 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74 (2017)) (leaving § 90-113.74(c)(5) unaltered).
97. Want to Use Utah’s Drug Database? Get a Warrant, STANDARD-EXAMINER (Dec. 17,
2015),
https://www.standard.net/opinion/our-view/want-to-use-utah-s-drug-database-get-awarrant/article_25b07725-68e3-58ed-8f90-ae357e718ddf.html [https://perma.cc/6NYM-CXB8].
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unprecedented. HIPAA, the federal statute regulating privacy of protected
health information, specifically addresses the appropriate scope of medical
data to be released to law enforcement. 98 Under HIPAA, releasing medical
data to law enforcement without a court order requires a showing that: (1)
“[t]he information sought is relevant and material to a legitimate law
enforcement inquiry”; (2) “[t]he request is specific and limited in scope to
the extent reasonably practicable in light of the purpose for which the
information is sought”; and (3) “[d]e-identified information could not
reasonably be used.” 99 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
has further validated this standard in administrative documents produced by
the agency.100
Adopting HIPAA standards to limit the scope of prescription data
available for an active investigation does not violate statutory intent. Under
the HOPE Act, CDIs must be certified by undergoing training on a variety
of topics related to drug diversion and prescription data; among other
requirements, the statute expressly includes “[d]ata privacy and security
provisions of [HIPAA] and other pertinent federal and State laws
governing privacy and security of confidential data and records.” 101
Although law enforcement is not itself a “covered entity” bound by
HIPAA,102 inclusion of HIPAA privacy provisions in mandatory training
for CDIs suggests statutory intent to adhere to the framework of HIPAA
protection of medical information.
Other states have taken similar stances. 103 For example, Delaware’s
PDMP statute delimits the scope of PDMP information available to law
enforcement using language essentially identical to that in HIPAA. 104
Access to PDMP data may be granted to law enforcement officials
“provided that such information be relevant and material to such
investigation, limited in scope to the extent reasonably practicable in light

98. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C) (2018).
99. Id.
100. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule: A Guide
for
Law
Enforcement,
DEP’T
OF
HEALTH
&
H UMAN
SERVS.
2,
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/emergency/final_
hipaa_guide_law_enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FMK-6NWZ].
101. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act of 2018, ch. 44, § 14.(b),
2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21, 32 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17E4(a)(14)(g)).
102. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).
103. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4798(l)(2)(d) (Supp. 9 2018); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1007(F)(3) (Westlaw through 2018 Third Extraordinary Session) (allowing release of PDMP
data without a court order if requirements identical to those enumerated under HIPAA in 45
C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C) are met).
104. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4798(l)(2)(d).
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of the purpose for which the information is sought, and include identifying
information only upon a showing of need.” 105
Incorporating similar language in the HOPE Act would help alleviate
the concerns of lawmakers like Representative Rogers that ambiguous
“good faith” standards requiring the prescription data be “reasonably
related” to the investigation create an unworkable standard for even
conscientious law enforcement officials. 106 Using specific language would
directly restrict inappropriate prescription data access, rather than
proximately relying on deterrence from laws punishing improper use of the
data. Moreover, incorporating this type of language into the statute would
not change the process proposed by the HOPE Act, so it would not
sacrifice any expedience prioritized by the law. While restoring a court
order requirement would be the ideal solution to protect data privacy,
unambiguous statutory language limiting type and scope of medication data
accessed would provide some privacy safeguards and has a better chance of
generating consensus in the North Carolina General Assembly.
B.

Allowing Revision of Personal CSRS Records

Because HIPAA regulations do not bind the CSRS, state law should
explicitly prescribe privacy protections for CSRS data, including the right
for individuals to amend their CSRS records. HIPAA applies to “covered
entit[ies]”—consisting of health plans, health care providers, and health
care clearinghouses—and their “business associate[s].”107 Prescribers and
pharmacists are HIPAA-covered entities, so inputting prescription data into
the CSRS is subject to HIPAA regulation. 108 However, the CSRS itself is
neither a HIPAA “covered entity” nor a related “business associate,” so
once CSRS data is entered into the system, it is no longer subject to HIPAA
regulation.109 State governments are, however, free to enumerate “privacy
and security requirements” under state law. 110 Therefore, the General

105. Id.
106. See Knopf, supra note 93.
107. 45 C.F.R § 160.103.
108. LISA N. SACCO, JOHNATHAN H. DUFF & AMANDA K. SARATA, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV.,
R42593,
PRESCRIPTION
DRUG
MONITORING PROGRAMS
27
(2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42593.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9B7-8XN2] (“PDMPs also receive
protected health information (PHI) from pharmacists and other health care providers (HIPAA
covered entities) who are subject to the federal HIPAA Privacy Rule.”).
109. Id. at 28 (“A PDMP is not a HIPAA covered entity, nor is it generally a business
associate[, so] . . . the HIPAA requirements and standards for maintaining the security and
privacy of the [protected health information] . . . that apply to HIPAA covered entities would not
apply to PDMPs.”).
110. Id. (“Although HIPAA may not apply, privacy and security requirements for PDMPs are
still enumerated under state law.”).
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Assembly has not only the privilege, but the prerogative to enact privacy
protections for CSRS data.
Although CSRS data is not subject to HIPAA regulation, explicit
references to HIPAA in mandatory CDI trainings suggest statutory intent to
comport to HIPAA standards, 111 including the right for patients to revise
mistakes in their prescription histories. Under HIPAA, patients have a
“right to . . . amend protected health information or a record about the
individual.”112 The entity housing the protected health information reserves
the right to deny the revision request if the records are accurate,113 and there
are also relevant exceptions, such as prohibiting revision of records that are
under investigation for criminal activity. 114 By carving out important
exceptions while allowing requests to amend patient medical records,
HIPAA evenly balances governmental (particularly prosecutorial) and
private interests regarding the right to revise protected health information.
Not allowing patients the right to revise potential mistakes in CSRS
data, particularly when patients do not get a choice as to whether their data
is included in the CSRS, 115 heavily impinges on patient autonomy. Under
North Carolina law, patients are allowed to view their records in the
CSRS,116 but there is no statutory or administrative grant of a right to
amend.117 The right to amend is particularly important because merely
being “under investigation” for opioid misuse can irrevocably impact lives,
even if individuals under investigation are later exonerated. 118 Given the

111. See supra text accompanying notes 101–05.
112. 45 C.F.R § 164.526(a)(1) (2018).
113. Id. § 164.526(a)(2) (“A covered entity may deny an individual’s request for amendment,
if it determines that the protected health information or record . . . [i]s accurate and complete.”).
114. Id. § 164.524(a)(1) (“[A]n individual has a right of access to inspect and obtain a copy of
protected health information about the individual . . . except for . . . [i]nformation compiled in
reasonable anticipation of, or for use in, a civil, criminal, or administrative action or
proceeding.”).
115. Strengthen Opioid Misuse Prevention Act of 2017, ch. 74, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 684,
685 (mandating reporting of prescription data by prescribers and dispensers).
116. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(c) (2017) (“The Department shall release data in the
controlled substances reporting system to . . . [a]n individual who requests the individual’s own
controlled substances reporting system information.”).
117. While prescribers have the right to correct their prescribing history, nowhere is it written
that patients have a right to correct their prescription history. See NC Controlled Substance
Reporting
System
(CSRS),
N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
https://www.ncdhhs.gov/divisions/mhddsas/ncdcu/csrs
[https://perma.cc/QX4Y-P7Q3].
Additionally, the patient form for requesting CSRS data does not include any reference to an
amendment or correction process. See Request for Individual’s Own Controlled Substances
Reporting System Information, N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
https://files.nc.gov/ncdhhs/documents/files/csrs-individualreq10-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/NCA2NGF3] (last updated June 2010).
118. Mark Greenblatt & Angela M. Hill, Exclusive Investigation: Your Prescriptions Aren’t
Private, WCPO CINCINNATI (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.wcpo.com/longform/so-you-think-
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devastating effects of an investigation predicated on faulty information, and
since HIPAA standards prevent the amendment process from impeding law
enforcement activities, the balance of equities between privacy and
prosecutorial utility favors explicitly importing the HIPAA “right to
amendment” for CSRS data.
CONCLUSION
While addressing the opioid crisis is of utmost importance, doing so
need not come at the cost of individual privacy, particularly by sacrificing
privacy of medical information. As it stands, the HOPE Act presents risk of
serious harms to individual privacy. While the HOPE Act was designed to
facilitate the investigative process by allowing law enforcement officers to
access CSRS data without a court order, analysis of PDMP programs at
large shows it is unclear whether PDMPs are effective. Given the
inconclusive evidence of their efficacy, and the lack of evidence that the
statutory regime in the HOPE Act would make the CSRS more effective,
protecting privacy of prescription data should accordingly be granted
greater weight, particularly since the harms of disclosing private medical
information without consent are well established. 119
Amending the HOPE Act can significantly improve prescription data
privacy. While reinstating the court order requirement for accessing the
CSRS would provide the most protection of privacy, several alternative
amendments could at least partially protect privacy interests. First, the
General Assembly should establish clear statutory penalties for improper
use of pharmacy-derived prescription data, and local law enforcement
agencies should establish regulatory penalties to the same end. Second, the
General Assembly should expand the scope of felonies created to deter
inappropriate use of CSRS data or remove overly constraining language
defining the mental state requirements for these felonies. Third, the General
Assembly should adopt HIPAA standards requiring that CSRS data
accessed pursuant to an active investigation is only shared to the extent
reasonably necessary to aid the enforcement efforts. Fourth, the General
Assembly should adopt HIPAA standards allowing patients to amend any
inaccuracies in their prescription history. The General Assembly adopting
these measures would go a long way towards restoring faith in the North
Carolina government’s management of sensitive data that, perhaps more
than any other, lies at the heart of who we are as individuals.

prescriptions-are-private [https://perma.cc/39AK-KAGD] (finding that an investigation based on
faulty evidence delayed a couple from adopting a child and nearly resulted in termination of both
suspects’ employment in the city fire department).
119. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 32, at 1142.
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